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HOW CLARK V. ARIZONA IMPRISONED
ANOTHER SCHIZOPHRENIC WHILE SIGNALING
THE DEMISE OF CLINICAL FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY IN CRIMINAL COURTS
Henry F. Fradella*
I. INTRODUCTION
Defenses of excuse based on mental illness have a long and
interesting history.' The insanity defense and various other de-
fenses based upon evidence of diminished capacity continue to
challenge the criminal justice system in a multiplicity of ways, both
philosophically2 and practically. 3 Public fascination with such de-
fenses, as well as frequent public outrage over them, is fueled by
Hollywood writers whose television and movie scripts inaccurately
portray how these defenses are actually used in courts of law.4 But
the most recent pronouncement by the U.S. Supreme Court deal-
* Professor of Law and Justice Studies, The College of NewJersey; Ph.D., Arizona
State University 1997;J.D., The George Washington University 1993; M. Forensic Sci.,
The George Washington University 1993; B.A., Clark University 1990.
I See generally Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental
Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcom-
ing 2007) (comprehensively examining the development of various formulations of
the insanity defense and related defenses of excuse based on mental illness, culminat-
ing with a critical analysis of the impact of the Court's decision in Clark v. Arizona on
defendants' future use of such defenses).
2 See, e.g., Vicki L. Plaut, Comment, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty but
Mentally Ill, 74J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 428, 431 (1983) (discussing the philosophi-
cal tensions in the law caused by its dual desires to punish criminal wrongdoers and to
mandate treatment and excuse "those who commit criminal acts while insane" be-
cause they are not morally culpable for their actions).
3 See, e.g., Bruce Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental
Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 557-63 (1995) (discussing the practical
problems with applying the legal tests for insanity and diminished capacity to various
types of mental illnesses).
4 See, e.g., Stephanie K. Lashbrook, The Insanity Defense, 36 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1596,
1620 (2003) ("Television shows and films ... depict[ ] gleeful and devious defendants
who use the insanity defense to 'get off' or 'beat the rap.' It is a misconception that is
popular with the entertainment industry: defendant commits a crime but successfully
raises an insanity defense. But, defendant is no longer insane at the time of the trial
... so defendant goes free! Ajury that subscribes to this misconception might delib-
erately ignore evidence of a defendant's legal insanity in order to avoid releasing a
violent criminal to walk the streets as freely as each juror."). For an interesting guide
to films as popular sources of information (and misinformation) about the law, see
the collection of essays in LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS (John Denvir ed.,
1996).
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ing with evidence of mental illness as the basis for criminal excuse
suggests that it is not only the general public that has grown in-
creasingly skeptical of such defenses. Indeed, the Court's 2006 de-
cision in Clark v. Arizona5 suggests that the judiciary is growing ever
more weary of such defenses. And, tragically for seriously mentally
ill people like the defendant in Clark, our increasing hesitancy to
excuse criminal conduct caused by serious mental illness carries
very unfortunate consequences.
The Court's decision in Clark v. Arizona casts doubt both on
mental health diagnostic standards and on mental health clini-
cians, stating that evidence concerning psychiatric diagnoses has a
"potential ... to mislead jurors"6 and that "[t] here are ... particu-
lar risks inherent in the opinions of the experts who supplement
the mental-disease classifications with opinions on incapacity. '
Moreover, the Court created what dissenting Justices Kennedy, Ste-
vens, and Ginsburg suspect will be an "evidentiary framework that
* . . will be unworkable in many cases."' And, worse yet, the Clark
decision irrationally creates standards for the lower courts that will
force juries "to decide guilt in a fictional world with undefined and
unexplained behaviors but without mental illness."9
The Clark ruling will undoubtedly cause increasing pressure
on an already over-burdened correctional system by adding more
seriously mentally ill convicts to a prison system that is not de-
signed to cope with such inmates.' ° More significantly, Clark limits
the options of mentally ill criminal defendants and their attorneys
in future cases, thereby calling into question the future of criminal
defenses of excuse based on mental illness.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Factual Background
Eric Clark killed a police officer in the line of duty, but Clark
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time the killing took
place. 1 The Supreme Court summarized the facts of the incident
as follows:
5 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716 (2006).
6 Id. at 2734.
7 Id. at 2735.
8 Id. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 2749.
10 See, e.g., JAMIE FELLNER & SASHA ABRAMNSKv, ILL-EQuIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OF-
FENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usalO03/
usal003.pdf.
11 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2717.
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In the early hours of June 21, 2000, Officer Jeffrey Moritz of the
Flagstaff Police responded in uniform to complaints that a
pickup truck with loud music blaring was circling a residential
block. When he located the truck, the officer turned on the
emergency lights and siren of his marked patrol car, which
prompted petitioner Eric Clark, the truck's driver (then 17), to
pull over. Officer Moritz got out of the patrol car and told Clark
to stay where he was. Less than a minute later, Clark shot the
officer, who died soon after but not before calling the police
dispatcher for help. Clark ran away on foot but was arrested
later that day with gunpowder residue on his hands; the gun
that killed the officer was found nearby, stuffed into a knit
cap. 12
At Clark's trial, friends, family, classmates, and school officials
all testified regarding his "increasingly bizarre behavior over the
year before the shooting." 3
Witnesses testified, for example, that paranoid delusions led
Clark to rig a fishing line with beads and wind chimes at home
to alert him to intrusion by invaders, and to keep a bird in his
automobile to warn of airborne poison. There was lay and ex-
pert testimony that Clark thought Flagstaff was populated with
"aliens" (some impersonating government agents), the "aliens"
were trying to kill him, and bullets were the only way to stop
them. A psychiatrist testified that Clark was suffering from para-
noid schizophrenia with delusions about "aliens" when he killed
Officer Moritz, and he concluded that Clark was incapable of
luring the officer or understanding right from wrong and that
he was thus insane at the time of the killing. In rebuttal, a psy-
chiatrist for the State gave his opinion that Clark's paranoid
schizophrenia did not keep him from appreciating the wrong-
fulness of his conduct, as shown by his actions before and after
the shooting (such as circling the residential block with music
blaring as if to lure the police to intervene, evading the police
after the shooting, and hiding the gun).4
Although the trial court determined that Clark "was indisputa-
bly afflicted with paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shoot-
ing," it found him guilty nonetheless, concluding that his mental
illness "did not ... distort his perception of reality so severely that
he did not know his actions were wrong. ' 15 Clark was sentenced to
12 Id. at 2716.
13 Id. at 2717.
14 Id. at 2717-18.
15 Id. at 2718.
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twenty-five years to life in prison. 16 His attorney then moved to
vacate the judgment and sentence on the grounds that both the
exclusion of psychiatric evidence to disprove mens rea and Ari-
zona's narrow formulation of the insanity defense violated his due
process rights. 17 The trial court denied this motion, the Arizona
Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished disposition, and the
Arizona Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 8 The United
States Supreme Court granted Clark's petition for certiorari on two
separate due process issues, each of which will now be separately
explored.
B. Clark's First Due Process Challenge: The Narrowing of M'Naghten
1. Background on the M'Naghten Test
In order to meaningfully explore the first of two due process
issues raised in Clark, a short primer on the M'Naghten test for in-
sanity is helpful. In 1843, the landmark case of Daniel M'Naghten
was decided.' 9 The legal standard for insanity set forth in that case
is still used in many U.S. jurisdictions today.20 M'Naghten was in-
dicted for the first-degree murder of Edward Drummond.2 Drum-
mond was the secretary to Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister of
England at the time.2 2 M'Naghten had intended to kill Peel, but
mistook Drummond for him.23 He explained to the court that he
wanted to kill the Prime Minister because "[t]he Tories in my na-
tive city .... follow, persecute me wherever I go, and have entirely
destroyed my peace of mind .... [T]hey do everything in their
power to harass and persecute me; in fact, they wish to murder
me."
24
At trial, M'Naghten's defense attorneys argued, in essence,




19 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). There are at least
twelve different spellings of Daniel M'Naghten's last name, something that he himself
likely contributed to since he appears to have spelled his own name differently on
several occasions. RIcHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE OF DANIEL McNAUGHTAN xi-xiii (1981).
20 Frontline: State Insanity Defense Laws, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front
line/shows/crime/trial/states.html (charting states' legal standards for insanity de-
fenses) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
21 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719. See also MORAN, supra note 19, at 1.
22 MORAN, supra note 19, at 1, 11.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 10.
25 Gerald Robin, The Evolution of the Insanity Defense: Welcome to the Twilight Zone of
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to "assemble four of the most able barristers in Britain . . . [and]
nine prominent medical experts." 26 The prosecution, on the other
hand, called "no expert witnesses. "27 Lord Chief Justice Tindal
charged the jury as follows:
The question to be determined is, whether at the time the act in
question was committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of
his understanding, so as to know that he was doing a wrong or
wicked act. If the jurors should be of opinion that the prisoner
was not sensible at the time he committed it, that he was violat-
ing the laws of both God and man, then he would be entitled to
a verdict in his favour: but if, on the contrary, they were of opin-
ion that when he committed the act he was in a sound state of
mind, then their verdict must be against him.28
The jury found M'Naghten "not guilty on the ground of in-
sanity. ' 29 M'Naghten was committed to Bedlam, the notorious asy-
lum, "where he remained until his death 22 years later."3 Much
public outrage over the acquittal followed, including condemna-
tion of the case from Queen Victoria who herself had been the
target of assassination attempts.3" The House of Lords subse-
quently set down what became known as the M'Naghten test for
insanity:
[I] t must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of
the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.
32
For a defendant to be excused from criminal culpability on
the basis of insanity under the M'Naghten test, it must be proven as
a threshold matter that he or she suffered from a qualifying
"mental disease or defect" at the time the offense was committed.3
But proof of such a "mental disease or defect" is insufficient; the
Mental Illness, Psychiatry, and the Law, 13J. CONTEMP. CRmM. JUST. 224, 226 (1997) (cit-
ing JOHN BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 97
(1955)).
26 MORAN, supra note 19, at 90.
27 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 969 n.20 (5th ed. 1989) (citing MORAN, supra note
19, at 90).
28 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719-20 (1843).
29 Robin, supra note 25, at 226.
30 Id.
31 Id. (citing BIGGS, supra note 25, at 99).
32 MNaghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
33 For a comprehensive discussion about what constitutes a "qualifying mental dis-
ease or defect" for insanity defense purposes, see Fradella, supra note 1, at Part III.A.
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mental disease or defect must have caused one of two things: cogni-
tive incapacity-the inability to know the nature and quality of the
act committed-or moral incapacity-the inability to know that the
act committed was wrong.34 The cognitive incapacity part of the
test relieves the defendant of criminal liability when he or she is
incapable of forming mens rea. If one does not know the quality of
one's acts, how can one be criminally reckless, negligent, or pur-
poseful? For example, if a man strangled another person believing
that he was squeezing the juice out of a lemon, he did not under-
stand the nature and quality of his act." This type of cognitive
incapacity is reasonably rare. It would occur when a person suffers
from such a severe psychotic disorder as to be so removed from
reality that the person would not even know what he or she is do-
ing. Take Daniel M'Naghten's case, for example. He knew the na-
ture and quality of his act. He wanted to kill the Prime Minister
and attempted to do so. He was, therefore, not cognitively incapac-
itated under the first prong of this formulation of the insanity test.
The second part of the M'Naghten test-the inability to distin-
guish right from wrong-is usually at the crux of an insanity de-
fense, as it was in Daniel M'Naghten's case. This moral incapacity
part of the insanity test relieves a defendant from criminal liability
even if he or she forms the requisite mens rea (as Daniel
M'Naghten formed intent to kill) so long as the defendant does
not understand that his or her act, even though committed with
specific intent, is wrong.
2. M'Naghten and Clark
Eric Clark asserted that Arizona's "guilty except insane" for-
mulation of the insanity defense violated due process because it
lacked the first prong of the M'Naghten test-the one aimed at the
cognitive capacity to know the nature and quality of one's acts.3 6
While Arizona had used the true M'Naghten test in the past, the
legislature omitted the cognitive incapacity part when it enacted its
"guilty except insane" formulation, thereby leaving only the part
34 These terms for the two prongs of the M'Naghten test were not widely accepted
when Clark was decided. A search in Westlaw's law review database yields no articles
using these terms in relation to the prongs of the M'Naghten test prior to the time
Clark was decided. Yet, these are the terms the Supreme Court elected to use in Clark,
even though the Court had never used them before. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709,
2719 (2006).
35 Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 253, 261 (1999).
36 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2719.
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about knowing right from wrong.3" A change to the state's insanity
law appears to have been prompted by the acquittal of a man for
the murder of his wife because he was found legally insane; he was
committed to a psychiatric institution but then released after just
six months, following a determination that he was no longer a dan-
ger to himself or others.3" It appears, however, that the statutory
change was not intended to alter substantively the test for insanity,
but rather the state legislature determined that "a streamlined stan-
dard with only the moral capacity part would be easier for the jury
to apply."39
Clark argued that the new statutory language in Arizona de-
prived him of his due process rights because eliminating the "na-
ture and quality" prong of M'Naghten's formulation of the insanity
test "'offend [ed a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 
40
Indeed such an argument had worked before the Nevada Supreme
Court in Finger v. State,41 although it had been rejected in Utah,
Idaho, and Montana.42 The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the
weight of state authority on the issue. It dismissed Clark's funda-
mental right argument outright, stating, "History shows no defer-
ence to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula to the level of
fundamental principle, so as to limit the traditional recognition of
a State's capacity to define crimes and defenses."4 In support of
this conclusion, the Court pointed to the many variations in the
insanity defense between states.44 States are therefore free to de-
37 Id. (citing Act effective Jan. 2, 1994, ch. 256, 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1500).
38 Ren& Melanoon, Note, Arizona's Insane Response to Insanity, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 287,
290 (1998).
39 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2723 n.24; see H.R. 41-156, 1st Sess., at 3 (Ariz. 1993); 1
RUDOLF GERBER, CRIMINAL LAW OF ARIZONA 502-06, 502-11 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp.
2000).
40 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2719 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)).
41 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001) ("Recognition of insanity as a defense is a core prin-
ciple that has been recognized for centuries by every civilized system of law in one
form or another. Historically, the defense has been formulated differently, but given
the extent of knowledge concerning principles of human nature at any given point in
time, the essence of the defense, however formulated, has been that a defendant must
have the mental capacity to know the nature of his act and that it was wrong."), cert.
denied, Nevada v. Finger, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
42 State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho
1990); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984).
43 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2719.
44 Id. at 2720-21. See also, e.g., Fradella, supra note 1, at Part II.D (tracing the
evolution of various legal tests for insanity from the early "Wild Beast Defense," which
subsequently evolved into the MNaghten test, to several modern formulations includ-
ing the Model Penal Code test, the modem federal formulation of the test under the
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fine insanity as they see fit without running afoul of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While seemingly unnecessary to do so, the Court took issue
with Clark's underlying logic, noting that, in practice, the cognitive
incapacity prong of the M'Naghten test and its moral incapacity
prong are intertwined.
[C]ognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral in-
capacity. Cognitive incapacity, in other words, is a sufficient
condition for establishing a defense of insanity, albeit not a nec-
essary one. As a defendant can therefore make out moral inca-
pacity by demonstrating cognitive incapacity, evidence bearing
on whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his
actions is both relevant and admissible. In practical terms, if a
defendant did not know what he was doing when he acted, he
could not have known that he was performing the wrongful act
charged as a crime.45
Accordingly, the Court felt that the first prong of the M'Naghten
test somewhat duplicated the second prong and, therefore, the
statutory omission of the cognitive incapacity test had little, if any,
effect on the overall fairness of an insanity case.46
C. Clark's Second Due Process Challenge: Arizona's Mott Rule
The second of Clark's due process challenges concerned the
rule set forth under Arizona law in State v. Mott.47 That case in-
volved the conviction of Shelly Kay Mott for "child abuse under
circumstances likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" and
for felony mtirder in the death of her daughter.48 Mott knew that
her daughter was being physically abused by her boyfriend; yet, she
not only failed to remove her daughter from the abusive environ-
ment, but also failed to obtain necessary medical care after her boy-
friend severely injured her daughter.49 At her trial, Mott sought to
introduce evidence through expert testimony that she lacked the
capacity to save her daughter because her own mental status was
significantly impaired due to the Battered Woman Syndrome.5"
The defense tried to use such evidence to rebut the prosecution's
argument that the child abuse via omission had been either know-
Insanity Defense Reform Act, and various unique state formulations such as "Guilty
But Mentally Ill" and "Guilty Except Insane").
45 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2722.
46 Id. at 2723-24.
47 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997).
48 Id. at 1049, 1047-48.
49 Id. at 1048-49.
50 Id. at 1049.
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ing or intentional within the meaning of these terms as mens rea
for criminal liability.51 The trial court refused to allow such evi-
dence, however, ruling that "the testimony regarding the battered-
woman syndrome was an attempt to establish a diminished capacity
defense" that was inadmissible under Arizona law. 52 The defen-
dant was convicted and appealed.53 The Arizona Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the "trial court's preclusion of defendant's
proffered testimony regarding battered-woman syndrome violated
due process. "''5 The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the decision
of the intermediate appellate court and reinstated the defendant's
conviction and sentence.55 The court reasoned that the proffered
expert testimony was, in fact, diminished capacity evidence that was
inadmissible because "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defen-
dant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative de-
fense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime. '56 But the Mott
court's broad holding was not required by state law. The court
could have strictly interpreted the state legislature's failure to
adopt a diminished capacity defense as a limitation on using dimin-
ished capacity as an affirmative defense 57 without barring the ad-
missibility of psychological testimony shy of insanity to negate mens
rea. 5 ' The dissent in Mott explained this critical distinction as
follows:
As the majority acknowledges, "the evidence of defendant's his-
tory of being battered and of her limited intellectual ability was
... offered.., as evidence to negate the mens rea element of the
crime. The majority further acknowledges that "[s]uch evi-
dence is distinguishable from an affirmative defense that ex-
cuses, mitigates, or lessens a defendant's moral culpability due
51 Id. at 1053.
52 Id. at 1049.
53 Id.
54 Id. (citing State v. Mott, 901 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)).
55 Id. at 1057.
56 Id. at 1051 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-502(A) (1995)).
57 See, e.g., id. at 1050 ("The Arizona legislature... declined to adopt the defense
of diminished capacity when presented with the opportunity to do so."). See also State
v. Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (Ariz. 1965) (en banc) (refusing to judicially recognize
the diminished capacity defense on the grounds that that the legislature is responsi-
ble for promulgating the criminal law and that it "ha[d] not recognized a disease or
defect of mind in which volition does not exist... as a defense to a prosecution" for a
crime), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1015 (1966).
58 See Mott, 931 P.2d at 1058 (Zlaket, C.J., concurring) ("I am unprepared to agree
that expert testimony must be strictly limited to M'Naghten insanity under all circum-
stances in any and every case, or that psychological evidence tending to negate an
essential element of the crime charged can never be admitted. Such an expansive
holding seems both unwise and unnecessary.").
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to his psychological impairment." Yet, despite recognizing this
distinction, the majority takes the inconsistent position that use
of psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea is the same as an at-
tempt to prove diminished capacity.
59
The result in Mott is interpreted as barring the admissibility of
all evidence of mental illness to disprove mens rea if not offered as
part and parcel of an insanity defense.6 ° The Mott rule thus pre-
vented the defendant in Mott from arguing that she did not enter-
tain the requisite mens rea for child abuse and murder in the same
way that it prevented Eric Clark from introducing evidence tending
to show that he did not entertain the mens rea for murder.
The U.S. Supreme Court felt that resolution of Clark's chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of Mott required an exploration of
three categories of evidence that affect mens rea within the Mott
framework. The first of these categories was termed "observation
evidence" by the Court.6" This category of evidence concerns the
observations of experts and laypersons alike regarding someone's
behavior-what someone said, how they behaved, their "tendency
to think in a certain way."6 2 Such evidence may be offered to sup-
port a clinical diagnosis or as evidence of an actor's state of mind at
the time of the commission of an offense. The testimony of Eric
Clark's family and schoolmates about his bizarre behavior in the
year leading up to the shooting falls under this category of evi-
dence. The second type of evidence relevant to proof of mens rea
is "mental-disease evidence"-opinion testimony, usually by a quali-
fied expert based on clinical assessment, that an actor fits the crite-
ria for a particular mental illness diagnosis.63 The testimony of
mental health professionals that Eric Clark suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia is an example of such evidence. The third subtype
of evidence the Supreme Court felt was relevant to prove mens rea
is "capacity evidence"-that which demonstrates a "defendant's ca-
pacity for cognition and moral judgment (and ultimately also his
capacity to form mens rea) .,64 The Court explained that such evi-
dence, like "mental-disease evidence," is usually offered in the form
of expert opinion testimony. In Clark, the mental health experts
proffered by the defense opined that Eric Clark lacked the capacity
to know his actions were wrong, while the opinions of the prosecu-
59 Id. at 1061 (Feldman,J., dissenting) (omissions in original) (citations omitted).
60 See id. at 1054 (majority opinion).
61 Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2724 (2006).
62 Id.




tion's experts were that Clark had such capacity in spite of his
psychotic state.65
The Court's tripartite evidentiary structure in Clark does not
appear anywhere in Mott. Moreover, the "razor-thin distinction [s]"
drawn by the Court did not get to the crux of Eric Clark's due
process challenge.66
Mott's holding was not restricted to mental-disease evidence.
The Arizona Supreme Court did not refer to any distinction be-
tween observation and mental-disease evidence, or lay and ex-
pert testimony. Its holding was stated in broad terms: "Arizona
does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short
of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens
rea element of a crime."67
It was precisely the exclusion of evidence of mental illness
from being used to determine whether Eric Clark had acted with
the requisite underlying mens rea that formed the basis of his sec-
ond due process challenge. His defense at trial centered on his
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Separate and apart from
whether this debilitating psychotic disorder rendered him legally
insane, he asserted that his mental illness made him delusional.
Part of his delusional belief system was that his town was inhabited
by aliens. Of particular relevance was his belief that the aliens were
governmental workers, including municipal personnel in Flagstaff
like Officer Moritz. If he delusionally thought Officer Moritz was
an alien and not a police officer, then he did not "knowingly"
shoot another human being, much less knowingly shoot an officer
of the law. 68 Eric Clark would therefore not be guilty under the
Arizona first-degree murder statute, an important point that the
majority failed to comprehend.
65 Id. at 2725 n.30. The Supreme Court noted that although Arizona permits testi-
mony on capacity evidence, as that term is defined by the Court, many jurisdictions
do not allow testimony on the ultimate issue to be decided in a case. ARz. R. EVID.
704 ("Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact."). But see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704(b) ("No expert witness testifying with respect to
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion
or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.").
66 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2741 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (quoting State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) ("The
legislature's decision ... evidences its rejection of the use of psychological testimony
to challenge the mens rea element of a crime.") (omission in original), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1234 (1997)).
68 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2743 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The Court seems to have unnecessarily created its own narrow
evidentiary scheme based upon its reading of the way Mott distin-
guished another Arizona case, State v. Christensen.
69
Christensen is distinguishable from the present case because the
evidence offered by the defendant in that case was not evidence
of his diminished mental capacity. Rather, the defendant
merely offered evidence about his behavioral tendencies. He at-
tempted to show that he possessed a character trait of acting
reflexively in response to stress. The proffered testimony was
not that he was incapable, by reason of a mental defect, of
premeditating or deliberating but that, because he had a ten-
dency to act impulsively, he did not premeditate the homicide.
Because he was not offering evidence of his diminished capacity,
but only of a character trait relating to his lack of premeditation,
the defendant was not precluded from presenting the expert
testimony.
7 0
First of all, the distinction made by the Mott court-between
character trait evidence about behavioral tendencies and dimin-
ished capacity evidence-was plainly wrong. "Character trait" evi-
dence of "behavioral tendencies" to act impulsively is diminished
capacity evidence. Such a "character trait" is part and parcel of an
impulse control disorder, defined as "the failure to resist an im-
pulse, drive or temptation to perform an act that is harmful to the
person or to others."7 1 Testimony classified as concerning "charac-
ter traits" and "behavioral tendencies" may well fall under the Clark
majority's definition of "observation evidence," but labeling such
traits and behaviors with the appropriate clinical diagnosis would
make them "mental-disease evidence" under Clark's evidentiary ru-
bric. The admissibility of the evidence, however, ought not to turn
on such a definitional distinction because both work together to
help jurors understand human behavior. And, regardless of the
definitional label, nothing changes the fact that both the observed
behaviors and the diagnosis which flows from them are evidence of
diminished capacity, as attested to by the facts of the Christensen
case. The defendant's impulse control disorder led him to commit
a murder under stress. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction in Christensen because he was not permitted
to offer a psychologist's testimony that, for him, killing under
69 628 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1981).
70 Mott, 931 P.2d at 1054 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
71 Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsoR-
DERS 663 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
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stressful circumstances was more "reflexive" than "reflective. '"72
The outcome in Christensen is surprising since impulse control dis-
orders,7 3 both historically and today, do not qualify as the basis of
excusing criminal conduct." In fact, several years after the Chris-
tensen decision, Arizona changed its insanity statutes to specifically
exclude impulse control disorders as qualifying mental diseases or
defects for insanity defense purposes75-a change not mentioned
in Mott or in Clark. Thus, the fact that Christensen was still relied
upon in Mott is somewhat befuddling.
Second, like the defendant in Christensen, the defendant in
Mott offered diminished capacity evidence not as an affirmative de-
fense, but rather as evidence to negate mens rea. Yet, such evi-
dence was permitted in Christensen and not in Mott, apparently
because in Christensen the Arizona Supreme Court simply decided
the evidence proffered by the defense was not diminished capacity
evidence while the evidence proffered in Mott was. Specifically, the
defendant in Mott sought to introduce Battered Woman's Syn-
drome evidence not to excuse her conduct, but rather to show that
she did not neglect her children knowingly, intentionally, reck-
lessly, or with criminal negligence. The defendant in Mott wanted
her expert to address the personality and character traits shared by
women who suffer from domestic violence and show how these
could lead someone in the defendant's position to fail unintention-
ally to protect her children from her boyfriend, who physically
abused both her and her children. She was denied the ability to do
SO.
7 6
The inconsistency in Christensen and Mott appears to be due, in
part, to the confusing nature of diminished capacity evidence. The
defense is not available in nearly half of all U.S. jurisdictions.7
72 Christensen, 628 P.2d at 582-83.
73 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 3, at 573-74.
74 ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-502(A) (2001) ("Mental disease or defect does not include
disorders that result from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or
drugs, character defects, psychosexual disorders or impulse control disorders.").
75 Id.
76 State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1234 (1997).
77 See Lucy Noble Inman, Note, Mental Impairment and Mens Rea: North Carolina
Recognizes the Diminished Capacity Defense in State v. Shank and State v. Rose, 67 N.C. L.
REv. 1293, 1308-09 (1989); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a)-(b) (West 1999)
("(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible
solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific
intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific
intent crime is charged. (b) As a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of
diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a criminal
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Moreover, the jurisdictions that recognize diminished capacity vary
greatly in the ways in which they permit the doctrine to be used.
Some jurisdictions restrict the use of diminished capacity evidence
to specific intent crimes.7 Other states further limit its use to cases
in which evidence of diminished capacity might cast doubt on the
specific intent requirements for murder liability only. 79 And still
other jurisdictions have adopted the Model Penal Code's ap-
proach, which allows diminished capacity evidence in any case
where the defendant's mental state is at issue.8" Section 4.02 of the
Model Penal Code reads, "Evidence that the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant
to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that
is an element of the offense."" The Model Penal Code approach
has been endorsed by the American Bar Association 82 and is the
one most frequently followed in those states recognizing dimin-
ished capacity."
Regardless of whether diminished capacity evidence is ac-
cepted as a complete or partial defense of excuse or not at all, the
separate factual question of whether a defendant actually enter-
tained the particular level of mens rea necessary for a criminal con-
viction may well depend on whether the defendant's mental illness
interfered with his or her ability to act with the requisite mens rea.
The dissent in Mott 4 and Justice Kennedy's dissent in Clark both
action or juvenile adjudication hearing."); see also Mott, 931 P.2d at 1049-50; State v.
Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 529 (Ariz. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1015 (1966).
78 Inman, supra note 77, at 1309 (citing Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984), superseded by statute, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (a) (2003), as
recognized in Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); State v.
Holcomb, 643 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)).
79 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Garcia, 479 A.2d 473 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1980)).
80 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-803(1) (2005) (evidence of mental impairment
admissible to negate mental element of any offense).
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1985).
82 CRIMINALJUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.2 (1984) ("Evidence, includ-
ing expert testimony, concerning the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
alleged offense which tends to show the defendant did or did not have the mental
state required for the offense charged should be admissible.").
83 Jennifer Kunk Compton, Note, Expert Witness Testimony and the Diminished Capac-
ity Defense, 20 Am.J. TRtAL ADVoC. 381, 388 (1996-1997) (citing the Third Circuit and
fourteen states in support of this approach; namely, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Utah, and Vernont).
84 State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1060 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (Feldman, J., dissent-
ing) ("[W]e deal here with evidence 'not offered as a defense to excuse [Defen-
dant's] crimes, but rather [with] evidence to negate the mens rea element of the
crime.' In other words, the evidence was offered to help the jury determine whether
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make this distinction clear."5 The majority opinions in both cases,
however, conflate the issue.
Third, notwithstanding Mott's flawed understanding of both
the psychological evidence at issue in Christensen and the nature of
diminished capacity evidence, the Clark Court's reliance on Mott's
interpretation of Christensen is still problematic. Assuming argu-
endo that the "character trait" at issue in Christensen did not con-
cern "mental-disease evidence" (which it did), using Mott's
reasoning, the outcome of Clark should still be different. The Mott
court accepted that the defendant in Christensen was offering evi-
dence of his inability to control his impulses as evidence that he
did not entertain the requisite mens rea for murder.8 6 Specifically,
the Christensen court held that denying the defendant the ability to
argue that his mental status interfered with his ability to act delib-
erately or with premeditation violated principles of "fundamental
justice. '87 Why, then, was Eric Clark denied the ability to argue
that his mental status interfered with his ability to act knowingly?
This inconsistency is exacerbated by the fact that the defendant in
Christensen was not psychotic, and Eric Clark was. Accordingly,
Clark had a much stronger case for demonstrating why his mental
illness interfered with his ability to form mens rea than did the
defendant in Christensen.
The Clark Court should have discerned the inconsistencies in
Mott and Christensen. It did not. It accepted Mott as settled state law
without regard to the due process implications that were argued by
Eric Clark. Moreover, the majority in Clark distilled a triad of evi-
dence types tending to establish mens rea from the illogical web of
strained reasoning in both Christensen and Mott. These evidentiary
distinctions were unnecessary. They are misleading enough that
Justice Kennedy called them an "evidentiary framework that ...
will be unworkable in many cases."' 8 The Court's handling of "ob-
servation evidence" provides a good example.
The Supreme Court is undoubtedly correct that laymen and
Defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, or with criminal negligence-
the only real issues in the case."), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997).
85 Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2747 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Crimi-
nal responsibility involves an inquiry into whether the defendant knew right from
wrong, not whether he had the mens rea elements of the offense.").
86 Mott, 931 P.2d at 1053.
87 State v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 580, 584 (Ariz. 1981) ("[I]t is inconsistent with
fundamental justice to prevent a defendant from offering evidence to dispute the
charge against him. This, of course, includes any elements which comprise the
offense.").
88 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2738 (KennedyJ., dissenting).
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experts alike have insights into a person's behavior, especially
when it is bizarre, and, therefore, their testimony concerning their
personal observations of a defendant's behavior is both relevant
and admissible."9 Presumably, this led the Court to interpret Mott
as having no effect on "observation evidence" regardless of
whether it was offered by a layperson or a qualified expert.9 ° In
contrast, the Court viewed Mott as limiting expert testimony with
regard to both "mental-disease evidence" and "capacity
evidence."91
But "mental-disease evidence" is not a separate and distinct
construct from either "observation evidence" or "capacity evi-
dence." Forensic clinical assessment involves not only the adminis-
tration of cognitive and personality tests, but also observations of
human behavior.92 Moreover, a person's capacity to understand
right from wrong is dependent not only upon a particular diagno-
sis, but also on how the disorder manifests itself in a given per-
son-something deduced by observing the patient. Thus, the
Court's categorization of evidentiary types creates a false trichot-
omy, as all three types of evidence are intertwined with each other.
Justice Kennedy points this out in his dissent:
The mental-disease evidence at trial was also intertwined with
the observation evidence because it lent needed credibility.
Clark's parents and friends testified Clark thought the people in
his town were aliens trying to kill him. These claims might not
be believable without a psychiatrist confirming the story based
on his experience with people who have exhibited similar be-
haviors. It makes little sense to divorce the observation evidence
89 See, e.g., State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280, 284 (Ariz. 1986). The general rule in Ari-
zona is that a lay witness may testify on the issue of the defendant's sanity, provided
that the lay witness
had an opportunity to observe the past conduct and history of a defen-
dant; the fact that he is a lay witness goes not to the admissibility of the
testimony but rather to its weight. If lay testimony is admitted, logically,
ajury is free to accept it as a basis for its verdict. This is so even if there
is conflicting medical testimony on the issue.
Id. (citations omitted).
90 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2726.
91 Id.
92 See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGICAL AssESSMENT: AN IN-
TEG RATrVE APPROACH (1991) (discussing practical ways to integrate the law into
clinical practice including assessing defendants' competency to stand trial, evaluating
their criminal responsibility, and preparing psychologists to serve as expert witnesses
by utilizing long-term observation of defendants' behavior to provide a more compre-
hensive description of mental state than traditional psychological testing, which may
only capture a microcosmic picture).
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from the explanation that makes it comprehensible. 3
Having unnecessarily created these three confusing and mis-
leading categories of behavioral evidence, the Court construed
Clark's due process challenge to Mott as limited to its prohibition
on "mental-disease evidence" from being used to establish dimin-
ished capacity.9 4 This challenge failed. 5 But by construing Clark's
claim so narrowly, the majority missed the gravamen of his second
issue. Clark's due process challenge was to Mott entirely. Not only
did he argue that barring diminished capacity evidence was a due
process violation, he also argued that even if it were constitution-
ally permissible to bar diminished capacity evidence, it would
nonetheless be unconstitutional to apply that rule in a manner that
prohibited a criminal defendant from attempting to prove that. he
lacked mens rea. To compound matters, the majority's substantive
holding on its narrow interpretation of Clark's challenge to Mott is
critically flawed for the reasons set forth below.
Justice Souter's majority opinion offers several bases for up-
holding the Mott rule. First, the Court reasoned that by confining
such evidence to the ultimate question of insanity, it preserved Ari-
zona's decision to allocate to the defendant the entire burden to
overcome the presumption of sanity.9 6 If the Court did not uphold
the Mott rule:
IT] he presumption of sanity would then be only as strong as the
evidence a factfinder would accept as enough to raise a reasona-
ble doubt about mens rea for the crime charged; once reasonable
doubt was found, acquittal would be required, and the standards
established for the defense of insanity would go by the boards.
Now, a State is of course free to accept such a possibility in its
law. After all, it is free to define the insanity defense by treating
the presumption of sanity as a bursting bubble, whose disap-
pearance shifts the burden to the prosecution to prove sanity
whenever a defendant presents any credible evidence of mental
disease or incapacity. In States with this kind of insanity rule,
the legislature may well be willing to allow such evidence to be
considered on the mens rea element for whatever the factfinder
thinks it is worth. What counts for due process, however, is sim-
ply that a State that wishes to avoid a second avenue for explor-
ing capacity, less stringent for a defendant, has a good reason
for confining the consideration of evidence of mental disease
93 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2739 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2729 (majority opinion).
95 Id. at 2737.
96 Id. at 2732.
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and incapacity to the insanity defense.
9 7
Thus, when a government makes a policy judgment-as Arizona,
many other states, and the federal government have done-to
place the burden on a defendant to prove his insanity by clear and
convincing evidence, allowing expert testimony on the defendant's
mental illness could usurp that allocation of the burden by al-
lowing such evidence to cast reasonable doubt on the defendant's
mens rea.
While logical, the practical effect of the Court's reasoning is
two-fold. First, it reaffirms the right of any U.S. jurisdiction to re-
fuse to allow a diminished capacity defense.98 Second, as Justice
Kennedy's dissent makes clear, it undercuts the basic principle of
due process that the prosecution must prove mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt. The insanity defense merely allows someone
who committed a criminal act (meaning they did a proscribed ac-
tus reus with the requisite mens rea) to be excused from his crimi-
nal conduct due to significant mental impairment. Thus, the
insanity defense separates "nonblameworthy from blameworthy of-
fenders."99 The insanity defense does not, however, have any effect
on a determination of the actor's underlying guilt, which turns on
whether the government can prove each and every element of a
criminal offense-including mens rea-beyond a reasonable
doubt. 00 A defendant like Daniel M'Naghten may well have
formed specific intent to commit a crime, but he may have done so
under totally morally blameless circumstances as a result of psycho-
sis. It is an entirely separate question whether a defendant formed
mens rea. The Mott rule, therefore, interferes with a defendant's
fundamental right to present evidence that calls into question
whether he entertained mens rea-an element on which that the
prosecution bears the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt.10'
While states have latitude to exclude relevant evidence offered
97 Id. at 2732-33.
98 Id. at 2733 n.42 (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 466-76 (1946)
(upholding a refusal to instruct a jury that it could consider the defendant's mental
deficiencies, which did not rise to the level of insanity, in determining the elements of
premeditation)).
99 Id. at 2731 (citing DONALD H. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL,
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (1983)).
100 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361-64 (1970).
101 Cf Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding that ajury instruc-
tion that had the effect of placing the burden on the defendant to disprove that he
had the requisite mental state violated due process).
[Vol. 10:127
CLARK V ARIZONA
by a criminal defendant, 112 they are constrained from doing so
when it interferes with that defendant's "'meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense."""' The deprivation of Eric Clark's
constitutional right to present a defense as to the element of mens
rea was at the heart of his due process challenge to Mott. Yet, the
majority decision in Clark dismissed this essential point because it
found that mental disease or "capacity evidence" was unreliable
enough to warrant a rule of evidence excluding it in spite of its
relevance, 104 much like is done for hearsay evidence.' 05
"While the Constitution ... prohibits the exclusion of defense
evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that
are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to pro-
mote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain
other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
potential to mislead the jury."' 6
The Clark Court found that both mental disorder evidence
and moral capacity evidence suffer from sufficient reliability issues
that Arizona was justified in limiting such evidence exclusively to
the question of insanity. In support of this conclusion, the Court
made three related arguments. First, it relied on language in the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders'07 (DSM-IV-TR) that its classifications reflect a
"consensus" about mental disorders at the time of publication that
may change as "' [n] ew knowledge generated by research or clinical
experience"' becomes available."' Thus, the Court reasoned, the
DSM-IV-TR masks "vigorous debate" within the psychiatric commu-
102 E.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
103 Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)) (citation omitted).
104 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2734.
105 For example, in Montana v. Egelhoff the Supreme Court upheld a statutory ban
on the consideration of evidence of voluntary intoxication even though such evidence
was highly relevant to the defendant's ability to form mens rea. 518 U.S. 37, 42
(1996). In so holding, the Court cited the evidentiary rules generally barring hearsay
evidence as an example of a prohibition on "the introduction of testimony which,
though unquestionably relevant, is deemed insufficiently reliable." Id. In dismissing
Clark's ability to introduce evidence of his mental state to prove he did not act with
the mens rea necessary for a murder conviction, the Court appears to have treated
mental illness evidence the same way it considered hearsay evidence and evidence of
voluntary intoxication in Egelhoff
106 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (quoting Holmes, 126 S. Ct. at 1732) (citing Crane,
476 U.S. at 689-90; Egelhoff 518 U.S. at 37; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973)).
107 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at xxxiii.
108 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2734 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at xxxiii).
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nity.' °9 While the Court was careful to state that the consequence
of this masking was not to "'condemn [mental-disease evidence]
wholesale,"' it concluded that "this professional ferment is a gen-
eral caution in treating psychological classifications as predicates
for excusing otherwise criminal conduct."
'" 0
The Court's second reason for affirming the holding in Mott
was its concern that, even when the diagnostic criteria is "broadly
accepted" and "uncontroversial," "mental-disease evidence" still
has the potential "to mislead jurors" by suggesting "that a defen-
dant suffering from a recognized mental disease lacks cognitive,
moral, volitional, or other capacity, when that may not be a sound
conclusion at all.""' This, according to the Court, is "because of
the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis." 12 But
this is an absurd line of reasoning since forensic psychological or
psychiatric testimony concerning a defendant's cognitive, moral, or
volitional capabilities not only remains admissible to prove in-
sanity, but also to prove a host of other criminal competencies
ranging from a mentally ill defendant's competency to stand trial,
waive Miranda rights, act as his or her own attorney, and be sen-
tenced and punished." 3
Finally, the Court asserted that there are "particular risks in-
herent in the opinions of the experts who supplement the mental-
disease classifications with opinions on incapacity.""' 4 The Court
reasoned,
Unlike observational evidence bearing on mens rea, capacity evi-
dence consists ofjudgment, and judgment fraught with multiple
perils: a defendant's state of mind at the crucial moment can be
elusive no matter how conscientious the enquiry, and the law's
categories that set the terms of the capacity judgment are not
the categories of psychology that govern the expert's profes-
sional thinking .... And even when an expert is confident that
his understanding of the mind is reliable, judgment addressing
109 Id.
110 Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 15, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (No. 05-5966)).
111 Id. at 2735, 2734.
112 Id. at 2735.
113 See generally HENRY F. FRADELLA, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY- THE USE OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2007) (explaining the evolution and applica-
tion of various legal standards and competencies that rely on forensic psychological
evidence); RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS (4th ed. 2004) (same).
114 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2735.
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the basic categories of capacity requires a leap from the con-
cepts of psychology, which are devised for thinking about treat-
ment, to the concepts of legal sanity, which are devised for
thinking about criminal responsibility."15
This argument is not novel. It has been made by courts and
scholars alike insofar as it posits that a mental health professional is
no more qualified than anyone else to decide whether a particular
defendant falls within the legal definition of insanity. 16 And while
an arguable position, it nonetheless misses the point in Clark be-
cause the evidence was not being restricted in the consideration of
insanity!1 ' Rather, the evidence was being restricted under Mott
for the purposes of establishing mens rea-an entirely different
line of analysis." 8
All three arguments offered by the majority opinion in sup-
port of its conclusion that Arizona may constitutionally limit the
introduction of "mental-disease evidence" and "capacity evidence"
to disprove mens rea collectively demonstrate a deep distrust of
forensic psychiatric or psychological clinical assessment. Do
laypeople understand that clinical depression can be so severe as to
cause psychotic breaks with reality?" 9 Would the common juror
understand that the auditory hallucinations experienced by
schizophrenics often cause them to play music loudly to drown out
the voices in their heads-something particularly relevant in the
Clark case?12° Who, if not a mental health professional, is more
qualified to give an opinion regarding whether a particular mental
illness interferes with a person's ability to act with specific intent?
Justice Kennedy makes this point quite eloquently in his dissent:
The existence of.. . functional psychosis [in this case] is beyond
dispute, but that does not mean the lay witness understands it or
115 Id. at 2735-36.
116 Id. at 2736 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at xxxii-xxxiii; PAUL C. GIANNELLI
& EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 9-3(B), at 286 (The Mitchie Co.
1986); RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 55 (1995)).
117 Such "ultimate issue" evidence is permissible under Arizona law. See ARiz. R.
EVID. 704, supra note 65. See also State v. Sanchez, 573 P.2d 60, 64 (Ariz. 1977)
("There is no inference, as a matter of law, that a defendant's insanity is established
because the state fails to call expert medical witnesses to rebut those of the de-
fense.... [T]hejury may be instructed that they may so find [such an inference], but
it is not required that they do so.").
118 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(" [T] he existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to
the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime.").
119 See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 369-76 (describing the criteria for
clinical diagnosis of a major depressive disorder and listing associated features).
120 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2739 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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that a disputed issue of fact concerning its effect in a particular
instance is not something for the expert to address.... [T]he
opinion that Clark had paranoid schizophrenia-an opinion
shared by experts for both the prosecution and defense-bears
on efforts to determine, as a factual matter, whether he knew he
was killing a police officer. The psychiatrist's explanation of
Clark's condition was essential to understanding how he
processes sensory data and therefore to deciding what informa-
tion was in his mind at the time of the shooting. Simply put,
knowledge relies on cognition, and cognition can be affected by
schizophrenia.'
1 2 1
Justice Kennedy's assessment is thoughtful and displays an under-
standing of the often-complicated nuances of human behavior.
And his point about how "mental-disease evidence" works hand-in-
hand with "observation evidence" demonstrates why the Court's tri-
partite evidentiary structure is nonsensical.
Not being able to offer all relevant evidence of his inability to
have killed Officer Moritz knowingly interfered with Clark's due
process right to present evidence, casting significant doubt on the
state's ability to meet its burden to prove mens rea beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.12 2 While states are free to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant to prove his own insanity, 123 the Mott rule has the
practical effect of unconstitutionally placing a burden of disprov-
ing mens rea on the defendant while simultaneously limiting the
defendant's ability to do so. 124 Arizona attempted tojustify this by
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977); In reWinship, 397
U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
123 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798, 799 (1952) (holding that Oregon's
statute requiring a criminal defendant pleading insanity to "establish that defense
beyond a reasonable doubt"-a heavier burden than was required by any other state
or by federal courts at the time-did not violate constitutional due process since "we
cannot say that [Oregon's] policy violates generally accepted concepts of basic stan-
dards of justice").
124 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2747 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A "jury instruction that had
the effect of placing the burden on the defendant to disprove that he had the requi-
site mental state violates due process." Id. (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 524 (1979)). Also, a jury instruction that only permitted the jury to consider an
accomplice's testimony "if it was true beyond a reasonable doubt 'place[d] an im-
proper burden on the defense and allow[ed] the jury to convict despite its failure to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Cool v. United States, 409 U.S.
100, 103 (1972) (per curiam)). Kennedy also noted that a "[s]tate can shift the bur-
den on a claim of self-defense, but if the jury were disallowed from considering self-
defense evidence for purposes of deciding the elements of the offense, it 'would re-
lieve the State of its burden and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate.'" Id. (quoting
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1987)).
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relying on Montana v. Egelhoff121 which upheld Montana's statutory
ban on allowing a defendant to present evidence of voluntary in-
toxication to rebut mens rea. 126 But this reliance on Egelhoff is mis-
placed. Egelhoff chose to become intoxicated; Clark did not
choose to have paranoid schizophrenia. The difference is a critical
one because Egelhoff's purposeful decision to become intoxicated
can serve as the basis of criminal liability, 27 while Clark lacks any
responsibility for having a mental state that renders him unable to
distinguish reality from a world filled with delusions and
hallucinations.
Having shown why the exclusion of forensic psychiatric or psy-
chological evidence on the issue of mens rea in Clark was a due
process violation, Justice Kennedy's dissent then takes issue with
the majority's argument that such evidence should be excluded
due to its potential to mislead or confuse the jury. First, a per se
ruling banning certain types of evidence as unreliable cannot be
constitutionally applied when the evidence at issue "'may be relia-
ble in an individual case.' ",12' Arizona has specialized rules of evi-
dence dealing with the admissibility of expert testimony, including
provisions to bar unreliable or speculative testimony as offered in a
particular case. 1 29 These rules have been held by Arizona courts to
allow a variety of types of psychological evidence to be used in cases
varying from the "psychological characteristics of molestation vic-
tims" 130 to "psychiatric testimony regarding neurological defi-
cits."'1 31  And, courts across the nation apply similar rules of
evidence to behavioral science testimony with surprising consis-
tency.' 32 Thus, having a per se rule against all forms of forensic
psychological testimony other than "observation evidence" is un-
necessary. Moreover, even if such a rule were necessary (which it is
125 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
126 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2748 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Egelhoff 518 U.S. at 50).
127 Egelhoff 518 U.S. at 44 (noting that "the intoxicated defendant 'shall have no
privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if
he were in his right senses"' and that "the law viewed intoxication 'as an aggravation
of the offence, rather than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour"' (quoting
MATTHEW HALE, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN *32; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES
*25-26)).
128 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2744-45 (KennedyJ., dissenting) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
129 Id. at 2745 (citing ARiz. R. EVID. 403, 702).
130 Id. (citing State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)).
131 Id. (citing Horan v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 806 P.2d 911, 914-15 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991)).
132 See Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral
Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 403, 441-43 (2002-2003).
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not), a state's interest in excluding potentially unreliable evidence
in courts of law must be balanced against an individual defendant's
due process rights.' And, ironically, it is "observation evidence"
that is the least scientifically valid and reliable form of forensic
mental health evidence. Consider that the diagnostic criteria in
the DSM-1V-TR-which is the basis for forming an opinion with re-
gard to "mental-disease evidence"-have been validated to varying
degrees,1"4 while the individual observations of a layperson or a
particular clinician cannot be empirically validated. The Mott rule,
therefore, bizarrely allows "unexplained and uncategorized ten-
dencies to be introduced while excluding relatively well-under-
stood psychiatric testimony regarding well-documented mental
illnesses."' 35
Justice Kennedy's dissent goes on to criticize the majority's
contention that forensic behavioral science runs too high a risk of
jury confusion. He attacks this faulty premise by noting that: "'We
have always trusted juries to sort through complex facts in various
areas of law.'"136 Although Justice Kennedy concedes that there
are numerous psychiatric diagnoses that might be confusing or
misleading to a jury, schizophrenia-the one at issue in Clark-is
not such a diagnosis. Schizophrenia "is a well-documented mental
133 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2744 (KennedyJ., dissenting). Kennedy notes that the Court
has invalidated various state rules because of the dangers of arbitrariness of applica-
tion. First, it invalidated a rule that excluded, in certain cases, evidence that a third
party may have committed the crime "'even if that evidence, if viewed independently,
would have great probative value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of ha-
rassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.'" Id. (citing Holmes v. South Caro-
lina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2006)). A second rule was invalidated because it
"exclud[ed] all hypnotically refreshed testimony [and] 'operate[d] to the detriment
of any defendant who undergoes hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the
circumstances under which it took place, or any independent verification of the infor-
mation it produced."' Id. (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56). Third, it invalidated a rule
that "exclud[ed] accomplice testimony [since the rule] 'prevent[s] whole categories
of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume
them unworthy of belief.'" Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967)).
134 See generally MICHAEL B. FIRST ET AL., DSM-IV-TR GUIDEBOOK 3-85 (2004). The
authors note that while there is a usefulness in applying the diagnostic system pro-
vided by the DSM-IV-TR to legal questions of competency and criminal responsibility,
DSM-IV-TR is a clinical document intended for "collegial use" in clinical practice. Id.
at 63. Further, the goal and purpose of the DSM-IV-TR may be "mismatch [ed]" to the
adversarial framework of the legal system, and "[m]ost legal questions require a black-
and-white dichotomization that is very much at odds with the shades of gray that char-
acterize most clinical situations." Id. Lastly, as a practical matter, the DSM-IV-TR defi-
nitions of mental disorder are clinical definitions "not equivalent" to the legal ones of
"mental disorder, mental disability, mental disease, and mental defect." Id.
135 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2745 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 289 (2005) (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part)).
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illness, and no one seriously disputes either its definition or its
most prominent clinical manifestations." '137 The experts proffered
by both Clark and the prosecution agreed that Clark suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia, and they further agreed that Clark "was
actively psychotic at the time of the killing."1" 8 Justice Kennedy
therefore concludes that if there were any jury confusion at all, it
was "the result of the Court's own insistence on conflating the in-
sanity defense and the question of intent."139 He argues,
Considered on its own terms, the issue of intent and knowledge
is a straightforward factual question. A trier of fact is quite capa-
ble of weighing defense testimony and then determining
whether the accused did or did not intend to kill or knowingly
kill a human being who was a police officer. True, the issue can
be difficult to decide in particular instances, but no more so
than many matters juries must confront. 4 °
III. CONCLUSION
Given how the Supreme Court's decision in Clark limited crim-
inal defendants' ability to argue defenses of excuse, there is every
reason to believe the sad trend of incarcerating mentally ill people
in prisons, rather than treating them in mental hospitals, will con-
tinue to increase. By upholding the overbroad Mott rule, the Clark
Court allows states to severely limit a mentally ill criminal defend-
ant from offering some of the most probative evidence concerning
his or her guilt. To prove that Eric Clark committed murder, the
prosecution in the Clark case introduced evidence that the defen-
dant had talked about wanting to kill police and then argued that,
to carry out this plan, the defendant lured police to the scene by
blaring music from his truck while circling a block in a residential
neighborhood. The defendant, however, was barred from intro-
ducing largely undisputed evidence about the nature of paranoid
schizophrenia and how the disease caused or could have caused his
actions.
For example, as Clark's expert testified during the insanity-de-
fense phase of his trial, schizophrenics often play music loudly
to drown out the voices in their heads and not to lure police
officers to their cars. But in the first phase of the trial, the judge
hearing the case (Clark waived his right to ajury) couldn't con-
sider that evidence in deciding whether the prosecution had
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proved first-degree murder.14 '
One can only hope that since Clark upheld the Mott rule under
Arizona law, the decision will have little impact beyond the state of
Arizona. However, both the language used in Clark and the under-
lying rationale do not bode well for the future of defenses of ex-
cuse based on mental illness. Indeed, the decision calls into
question the future admissibility of, and weight to be accorded to,
forensic behavioral science evidence. While that is a shame since
the behavioral sciences have much to offer the law, the real tragedy
concerns Eric Clark and those like him.
Politicians don't like paying for care for the critically mentally
ill. And the courts, in their zeal to protect the rights of the men-
tally ill, often neglect their welfare; the courts will generally not
allow authorities to hold anyone for treatment in the absence of
evidence that he poses a threat, evidence not always available
before somebody gets hurt.
14 2
With such a sorry state of affairs being the sad reality in pres-
ent times, the correctional system will likely continue to be bur-
dened with mentally ill inmates who do not belong in prisons, but
rather should be treated and cared for in secure mental hospitals.
Worse yet, more defendants like Eric Clark may find themselves in
a confusing web of unworkable evidentiary frameworks that pre-
vent them from arguing what should be a "straightforward defense:
[that they] did not commit the crime with which [they were]
charged" because they lacked the requisite mens rea. 1
43
Few people, if any, would argue that Eric Clark belongs on the
streets. The issue is whether he belongs in prison or in a secure
mental hospital where he would receive treatment for his schizo-
phrenia. Unfortunately, Eric Clark now is one of the many severely
mentally ill people who will be incarcerated in an inappropriate
venue where his condition is likely only to deteriorate. 4 4 Estimates
141 Emily Bazelon, Crazy Law: The Supreme Court Beats Up on the Insanity Defense,
StT, July 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2145139.
142 Insanity Offense: Too Often, Mentally Ill People and Their Families Can't Get Help,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2006, at A20, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/21/AR2006042101548.html.
143 Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144 See generally Alina Perez et al., Reversing the Criminalization of Mental Illness, 49
CRIME & DELINQ. 62 (2003) (citing lack of states' investment in therapeutic facilities
for increased numbers of mentally ill individuals in penal institutions); HEATHER
BAR, PRISONS AND JAILS: HOSPiTALS OF LAST RESORT (1999), available at http://www.
urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/mentalhealth/PrisonsJails.pdf (arguing that New
York largely fails at diverting seriously mentally ill people to treatment rather than jail
and further fails in discharge planning, leading to a "revolving door" of repeated
hospitalizations and incarcerations); H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Per-
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of the percentage of incarcerated people with serious mental disor-
ders range from a conservative 7.2%,' 45 to 20%, 146 to upwards of
44% of certain homicide offenders.'4 7 Both empirical research
and common sense tell us that the mentally ill criminal offender
often does not receive adequate treatment while incarcerated.14
"The lack of adequate mental health resources exacerbates existing
serious mental conditions for inmates, resulting in decompensa-
tion in inmate mental and physical health, inmate suicides, and
related complications in inmate management for correctional offi-
cials." '49 Scholars have repeatedly demonstrated that the mentally
ill inmate fails to adapt to life in jail or prison on every measure of
psychological adaptation. 5 ° This fact often manifests itself in sig-
nificantly higher rates of disciplinary infractions 15' and suicide
sons with Severe Mental Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483,
486, 490 (1998) (noting that, although "deinstitutionalization set the stage for in-
creasing numbers of mentally ill persons to enter the criminal justice system," many of
the ensuing problems could be addressed by increasing the availability of a wide
range of mental heath treatment options, which "would result in far fewer mentally ill
persons' committing criminal offenses").
145 T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe
Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 Am. J. CRIM. L. 283, 287
(1996-1997) (citing E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY
ILL: THE ABUSE OFJAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 13 (1992)).
146 Fox Butterfield, Prisons Replace Hospitals for the Nation's Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1998, at Al; see also Traolach Brugha et al., Psychosis in the Community and in
Prisons: A Report From the British National Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity, 162 AM.J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 774, 776 (2005) (reporting a rate of psychosis in prisons more than ten times the
rate that exists in the general population); Seena Fazel &John Danesh, Serious Mental
Disorder in 23 000 Prisoners: A Systematic Review of 62 Surveys, 359 LANCET 545 (2002)
(reporting that 3.7% of men had psychotic illnesses, 10% suffered from major depres-
sion, and 65% had a personality disorder; while 4% of women had psychotic illnesses,
12% suffered from major depression, and 42% had a personality disorder); Stone,
supra note 145, at 288 (citing Linda A. Teplin, The Prevalence of Severe Mental Disorder
Among Male Urban Jail Detainees: Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Pro-
gram, 80 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 663, 665-66 (1990) (reporting range from 6.36% to
9.48%)).
147 Sheilagh Hodgins, Assessing Mental Disorder in the Criminal Justice System: Feasibility
Versus Clinical Accuracy, 18 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 15, 19 (1995).
148 FELLNER & ABRAMSKY, supra note 10, passim; Earl Stahl & Mary West, Growing
Population of Mentally Ill Offenders Redefines Correctional Facility Design, CORRECTIONS To-
DAY, Aug. 2001, at 72.
149 Stone, supra note 145, at 285; see also Graham J. Towl, Suicide in Prisons, 5 BIT. J.
FORENSIC PRAC. 28 (2003) (positing that high rate of suicides linked to lack of psycho-
logical support); cf Jarrod S. Steffan & Robert D. Morgan, Meeting the Needs of Mentally
Ill Offenders: Inmate Service Utilization, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2005, at 38 (suggesting
ways to better improve care of mentally ill inmates).
150 Stone, supra note 145, at 299 (citing HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, COPING:
MALADAPTATION IN PRISONS 42, 50-54 (1989)).
151 Id. at 300 (citing TOCH & ADAMS, supra note 150, at xvii, xix); see also Merrill
Rotter et al., The Impact of the "Incarceration Culture" on Reentry for Adults with Mental
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rates 1 52 for inmates who are mentally ill than for those who are not.
Yet, we keep treating mentally ill criminal offenders as if they were
common criminals, a trend that has been labeled the "criminaliza-
tion of the mentally ill.' 5 3 Changes in the law concerning de-
fenses of excuse since the early 1980s have severely curtailed the
ability of people like Eric Clark to be removed from society and
properly treated in a rehabilitative setting rather than being pun-
ished in prison. The Supreme Court's decision in Clark is likely to
only exacerbate that problem.
Illness: A Training and Group Treatment Model, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 265 (2005) (for-
mulating a treatment model for mental hospital patients who were previously incar-
cerated because their behavior can pose special challenges to mental health
providers).
152 Stone, supra note 145, at 302-03 (citing TORREY ET AL., supra note 145, at 60-61);
see also Rotter et al., supra note 151; Stefan Frfihwald & Patrick Frottier, Suicide in
Prison, 366 LANCET 1242, 1243 (2005) (noting that there is "a consistent finding world-
wide that suicide rates in custody exceed those in the general male population") (in-
ternal footnotes and citations omitted).
153 E.g., Cameron Quanbeck et al., Mania and the Law in California: Understanding the
Criminalization of the Mentally Ill, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1245 passim (2003), available at
http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/160/7/1245/. See also, e.g., TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CENTER, FACT SHEET: CRIMINALIZATION OF AMERICANS WITH SEVERE MENTAL
ILLNESSES, http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/fact3.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
2007).
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